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Abstract
In this work, we demonstrate the existence of universal adver-
sarial audio perturbations that cause mis-transcription of audio
signals by automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems. We
propose an algorithm to find a single quasi-imperceptible per-
turbation, which when added to any arbitrary speech signal,
will most likely fool the victim speech recognition model. Our
experiments demonstrate the application of our proposed tech-
nique by crafting audio-agnostic universal perturbations for the
state-of-the-art ASR system – Mozilla DeepSpeech. Addition-
ally, we show that such perturbations generalize to a significant
extent across models that are not available during training, by
performing a transferability test on a WaveNet based ASR sys-
tem.
Index Terms: speech recognition, adversarial examples,
speech processing, computer security
1. Introduction
Machine learning agents serve as the backbone of several
speech recognition systems, widely used in personal assis-
tants of smartphones and home electronic devices (e.g. Apple
Siri, Google Assistant). Traditionally, Hidden Markov Mod-
els (HMMs) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] were used to model sequen-
tial data but with the advent of deep learning, state-of-the-art
speech recognition systems are based on Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) [7, 8, 9, 10].
However, several studies have demonstrated that DNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial examples [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. An ad-
versarial example is a sample from the classifier’s input domain
which has been perturbed in a way that is intended to fool a
victim machine learning (ML) model. While the perturbation
is usually imperceptible, such an adversarial input can mislead
neural network models deployed in real-world settings causing
it to output an incorrect class label with higher confidence.
A vast amount of past research in adversarial machine
learning has shown such attacks to be successful in the im-
age domain [16, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20]. However, few works
have addressed attack scenarios involving other modalities such
as audio. This limits our understanding of system vulnerabili-
ties of many commercial speech recognition models employing
DNNs, such as Amazon Alexa, Google Assistant, and home
electronic devices like Amazon Echo and Google Home. Re-
cent studies that have explored attacks on automatic speech
recognition (ASR) systems [21, 22, 23, 24], have demonstrated
that adversarial examples exist in the audio domain. The au-
thors of [22] proposed targeted attacks where an adversary de-
signs a perturbation that can cause the original audio signal to
be transcribed to any phrase desired by the adversary. How-
ever, calculating such perturbations requires the adversary to
solve an optimization problem for each data-point they wish to
mis-transcribe. This makes the attack in-applicable in real-time
since the adversary would need to re-solve the data-dependent
optimization problem from scratch for every new data-point.
Universal Adversarial Perturbations [25] have demon-
strated that there exist universal image-agnostic perturbations
which when added to any image will cause the image to be mis-
classified by a victim network with high probability. The exis-
tence of such perturbations poses a threat to machine learning
models in real world settings since the adversary may simply
add the same pre-computed universal perturbation to a new im-
age and cause mis-classification.
Contributions: In this work, we seek to answer the question
“Do universal adversarial perturbations exist for neural net-
works in audio domain?” We demonstrate the existence of uni-
versal audio-agnostic perturbations that can fool DNN based
ASR systems.1 We propose an algorithm to design such univer-
sal perturbations against a victim ASR model in the white-box
setting, where the adversary has access to the victim’s model
architecture and parameters. We validate the feasibility of our
algorithm, by crafting such perturbations for Mozilla’s open
source implementation of the state-of-the-art speech recogni-
tion system DeepSpeech [10]. Additionally, we discover that
the generated universal perturbation is transferable to a signif-
icant extent across different model architectures. Particularly,
we demonstrate that a universal perturbation trained on Deep-
Speech can cause significant transcription error on a WaveNet
[9] based ASR model.
2. Related Work
Adversarial Attacks in the Audio Domain: Adversarial at-
tacks on ASR systems have primarily focused on targeted at-
tacks to embed carefully crafted perturbations into speech sig-
nals, such that the victim model transcribes the input audio
into a specific malicious phrase, as desired by the adversary
[21, 22, 26, 23, 27]. Prior works [23, 27] demonstrate successful
attack algorithms targeting traditional speech recognition mod-
els based on HMMs and GMMs, that operate on Mel Frequency
Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) representation of audio. For ex-
ample, in Hidden Voice Commands [23], the attacker uses in-
verse feature extraction to generate obfuscated audio that can
be played over-the-air to attack ASR systems. However, obfus-
cated samples sound like random noise rather than normal hu-
man perceptible speech and therefore come at the cost of being
1Sound Examples: universal-audio-perturbation.herokuapp.com
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fairly perceptible to human listeners. Additionally, these attack
frameworks are not end-to-end, which render them impractical
for studying the vulnerabilities of modern ASR systems – that
are entirely DNN based.
In more recent work [22], Carlini et al. propose an end-to-
end white-box attack technique to craft adversarial examples,
which transcribe to a target phrase. Similar to the work in im-
ages, they propose a gradient-based optimization method that
replaces the cross-entropy loss function used for classification,
with a Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC) loss [28]
which is optimized for time-sequences. The CTC-loss between
the target phrase and the network’s output is backpropagated
through the victim neural network and the MFCC computation,
to update the additive adversarial perturbation. The adversarial
samples generated by this work are quasi-perceptible, motivat-
ing a separate work [29] to minimize the perceptibility of the
adversarial perturbations using psychoacoustic hiding.
Designing adversarial perturbations using all the above
mentioned approaches requires the adversary to solve a data de-
pendent optimization problem for each input audio signal the
adversary wishes to mis-transcribe, making them ineffective in
a real-time attack scenario. In other words, targeted attacks
must be customized for each segment of audio, a process that
cannot yet be done in real-time. The existence of universal ad-
versarial perturbations (described below) can pose a more seri-
ous threat to ASR systems in real-world settings since the adver-
sary may simply add the same pre-computed universal adversar-
ial perturbation to any input audio and fool the DNN based ASR
system.
Universal Adversarial Perturbations: The authors of [25]
craft a single universal perturbation vector which can fool a vic-
tim neural network to predict a false classification output on the
majority of validation instances. Let kˆ(x) be the classification
output for an input x that belongs to a distribution µ. The goal
is to find a perturbation v such that: kˆ(x + v) 6= kˆ(x) for
“most” x ∈ µ. This is formulated as an optimization prob-
lem with constraints to ensure that the universal perturbation is
within a specified p-norm and is also able to fool the desired
number of instances in the training set. The proposed algorithm
iteratively goes over the training dataset to build a universal
perturbation vector that pushes each data point to its decision
boundary. The authors demonstrate that it is possible to find
a quasi-imperceptible universal perturbation that pushes most
data points outside the correct classification region of a vic-
tim model. More interestingly, the work demonstrates that the
universal perturbations are transferable across models with dif-
ferent architectures. The perturbation produced using one net-
work such as VGG-16 can also be used to fool another network
e.g. GoogLeNet showing that their method is doubly universal.
Universal adversarial perturbations for images focuses on the
goal of mis-classification and cannot directly be applied to the
more challenging goal of mis-transcription by Speech Recogni-
tion System. In our work we address this challenge and solve
an alternate optimization problem to adapt the method for de-
signing universal adversarial perturbations for ASR systems.
3. Methodology
3.1. Threat Model
We aim to find a universal audio perturbation, which when
added to any speech waveform, will cause an error in transcrip-
tion by a speech recognition model with high probability. For
the success of the attack, the error in the transcription should
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Figure 1: Threat Model: We aim to find a single perturbation
which when added to any arbitrary audio signal, will most likely
cause an error in transcription by a victim Speech Recognition
System
be high enough so that the transcription of the perturbed signal
(adversarial transcription) is incomprehensible and the original
transcription cannot be deduced from the adversarial transcrip-
tion. As discussed in [22], the transcription “test sentence” mis-
spelled as “test sentense” does little to help the adversary. To
make the adversary’s goal challenging, we report success only
when the Character Error Rate (CER) or the normalized Lev-
enshtein distance (Edit Distance) [30] between the original and
adversarial transcription is greater than a particular threshold.
Formally, we define our threat model as follows:
Let µ denote a distribution of waveforms and C be the vic-
tim speech recognition model that transcribes a waveform x to
C(x). The goal of our work is to find perturbations v such that:
CER(C(x), C(x+ v)) > t for “most” x ∈ µ
Here, CER(x, y) is the edit distance between the strings x
and y normalized [30] by the length of x i.e
CER(x, y) =
EditDistance(x, y)
length(x)
The threshold t is chosen as 0.5 for our experiments i.e., we
report success only when the original transcription has been
edited by at least 50% of its length using character removal,
insertion, or substitution operations.
The universal perturbation signal v is chosen to be of a fixed
length and is cropped or zero-padded at the end to make it equal
to length of the signal x.
3.2. Distortion Metric
To quantify the distortion introduced by some adversarial per-
turbation v, an l∞ metric is commonly used in the space of
images. Following the same convention, in the audio domain
[13], the loudness of the perturbation can be quantified using
the dB scale, where dB(v) = maxi(20. log10(vi)). We cal-
culate dBx(v) to quantify the relative loudness of the universal
perturbation v with respect to an original waveform x where:
dBx(v) = dB(v)− dB(x)
Since the perturbation introduced is quieter than the original
signal, dBx(v) is a negative value, where smaller values indi-
cate quieter distortions. In our results, we report the average
relative loudness: dBx(v) across the whole test set to quantify
the distortion introduced by our universal perturbation.
3.3. Problem Formulation and Algorithm
Our goal to find a quasi-imperceptible universal perturbation
vector v such that it mis-transcribes most data points sampled
from a distribution µ. Mathematically, we want to find a pertur-
bation vector v that satisfies:
1. ‖v‖∞ < 
2. P
x∼µ
(CER(C(x), C(x+ v) > t)) ≥ δ.
Here  is the maximum allowed l∞ norm of the perturbation,
δ is the desired attack success rate and t is the threshold CER
chosen to define our success criteria.
To solve the above problem, we adapt the universal ad-
versarial perturbation algorithm proposed by [25] to find uni-
versal adversarial perturbations for the goal of mis-transciption
of speech waveforms instead of mis-classification of data (im-
ages). Let X = x1, x2, . . . , xm be a set of speech signals sam-
pled from the distribution µ. Our Algorithm (1) goes over the
data-points in X iteratively and gradually builds the perturba-
tion vector v. At each iteration i, we seek a minimum perturba-
tion ∆vi, that causes an error in the transcription of the current
perturbed data point xi + v. We then add this additional per-
turbation ∆vi to the current universal perturbation v and clip
the new perturbation v, if necessary, to satisfy the constraint
‖v‖∞ < .
Algorithm 1 Universal Adversarial Perturbations for Speech
Recognition Systems
1: input: Training Data Points X , Validation Data Points Xv
Victim Model C, allowed distortion level , desired success
rate δ
2: output: Universal Adversarial Perturbation vector v
3: Initialize v ← 0
4: while SuccessRate(Xv) < δ do
5: for each data point xi ∈ X do
6: if CER(C(xi + v + r), C(xi)) < t then
7: Compute min perturbation that
mis-transcribes xi + v:
∆vi ← arg minr ‖r‖2 s.t.:
CER(C(xi + v + r), C(xi)) > t
8: Update and clip universal perturbation v:
v = Clipv,(v + ∆vi)
At each iteration we need to solve the following optimiza-
tion problem, that seeks a minimum (under l2 norm) additional
perturbation ∆vi, to mis-transcribe the current perturbed audio
signal xi + v:
∆vi ← arg min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. CER(C(xi + v + r), C(xi)) > t
(1)
It is non-trivial to solve the above optimization in its cur-
rent form. In [25], the authors try to solve a similar optimiza-
tion problem for the goal of mis-classification of data points.
They approximate its solution using DeepFool [31] which finds
a minimum perturbation vector that pushes a data point to its de-
cision boundary. Since we are tackling a more challenging goal
of mis-transcription of signals where we have decision bound-
aries for each audio frame across the time axis, the same idea
cannot be directly applied. Therefore, we approximate the solu-
tion to the optimization problem given by Equation 1 by solving
a more tractable optimization problem:
Minimize J(r) where
J(r) = c‖r‖2 + L(xi + v + r, C(xi))
s.t. ‖v + r‖∞ < 
where L(x, y) = −CTCLoss(f(x), y)
(2)
In other words, to mis-transcribe the signal, we aim to max-
imize the CTC-Loss between the predicted probability distribu-
tions of the perturbed signal f(xi+v+r) and the original tran-
scription C(xi) while having a regularization penalty on the l2
norm of r. Since this a non-convex optimization problem, we
approximate its solution using iterative gradient sign method
[32]:
r0 =
−→
0
rN+1 = Clipr+v,{rN − αsign(∆rN J(rN )}
(3)
Note that the error J is back-propagated through the entire
neural network and the MFCC computation to the perturbation
vector r. We iterate until we reach the desired CER threshold
t for a particular data point xi. The regularization constant c
is chosen through hyper-parameter search on a validation set to
find the maximum success rate for a given magnitude of allowed
perturbation.
4. Experimental Details
We demonstrate the application of our proposed attack algo-
rithm on the pre-trained Mozilla DeepSpeech model [33, 10].
We train our algorithm on the Mozilla Common Voice Dataset
[10] which contains 582 hours of audio across 400,000 record-
ings in English. We train on a randomly selected set X con-
taining 5,000 audio files from the training set and evaluate our
model on both the training set X and the entire unseen valida-
tion set of the Mozilla Common Voice Dataset. We analyze the
effect of the size of the set X below. The length of our univer-
sal adversarial perturbation is fixed to 150,000 samples which
corresponds to around 9 seconds of audio at 16 KHz. The uni-
versal adversarial perturbations are trained using our proposed
algorithm 1 with a learning rate α = 5 and the regularization
parameter c set to 0.5.
Evaluation: We utilize two metrics: i) Mean CER - Character
Error Rate averaged over the entire test set and ii) Success Rate
to evaluate our universal adversarial perturbations. We report
success on a particular waveform, if the CER between the orig-
inal and adversarial transcription (Section 3.1) is greater than
0.5. The amount of perturbation is quantified using mean rela-
tive distortion dBx(v) over the test set (Refer to Section 3.2).
5. Results
Table 1 shows the results of our algorithm for different al-
lowed magnitude of universal adversarial perturbation on both
the training set X and the unseen Test Set. Both the success
rate and the Mean Character Error Rate (CER) increase with
increase in the maximum allowed perturbation. We achieve a
success rate of 89.06 % on the validation set, with the mean
distortion metric dBx(v) ≈ −32dB. To interpret the results
in context, −32dB is roughly the difference between ambient
noise in a quiet room and a person talking [34, 22] . We en-
courage the reader to listen to our adversarial samples and their
corresponding transcriptions on our web page (link in the foot-
note of the first page)
Table 1: Results of our algorithm for different allowed magni-
tude of universal adversarial perturbation
Training Set (X) Test Set
‖v‖∞ MeandBx(v)
Success
Rate (%)
Mean
CER
Mean
dBx(v)
Success
Rate (%)
Mean
CER
100 -42.03 57.46 0.63 -41.86 56.13 0.64
150 -38.51 72.78 0.81 -38.34 72.49 0.82
200 -36.01 83.27 0.92 -35.84 80.47 0.95
300 -32.49 89.52 1.10 -32.32 89.06 1.11
400 -30.18 90.60 1.06 -29.82 88.24 1.07
Figure 2 shows the success rate and mean edit distance com-
pared to the size of the training set X for maximum allowed
perturbation ‖v‖∞ = 200 (Mean dBx(v) = −36.01). We ob-
serve that it is possible to train our proposed algorithm on very
few examples and achieve reasonable success rates on unseen
data. For example, training on just 1000 examples can achieve
a success rate of 80.47 % on the test set.
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Figure 2: Attack Success Rate on the test set vs. the number of
audio files in the training set X
5.1. Effectiveness of universal perturbations
In order to assess the vulnerability of the victim Speech Recog-
nition System to our attack algorithm, we compare our univer-
sal perturbation with random (uniform) perturbation having the
same magnitude of distortion (same ‖v‖∞) as our universal ad-
versarial perturbation. Figure 3 shows the plot of success rate
vs. the magnitude of the perturbation for each of these pertur-
bations. It can be seen that universal adversarial perturbations
are able to achieve high success rate with very low magnitude
of distortion as compared to a random noise perturbation. For
example, for allowed perturbation ‖v‖∞ = 100 our universal
perturbation achieves a success rate of 65% which is substan-
tially higher than the success rate of random noise. This implies
that for the same magnitude of distortion, distorting an audio
waveform in a random direction is significantly less likely to
cause mis-transcription as compared to distorting the waveform
in the direction of universal perturbation. Our results support
the hypothesis discussed in [25], demonstrating that universal
adversarial perturbations exploit geometric correlations in the
decision boundaries of the victim model.
5.2. Cross-model Transferability
We perform a study on the transferability of adversarial sam-
ples to deceive ML models that have not been used for train-
ing the universal adversarial perturbation, i.e., their parameters
and network structures are not revealed to the attacker. We train
universal adversarial perturbations for Mozilla DeepSpeech and
evaluate the extent to which they are valid for a different ASR
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Figure 3: Success Rate vs ‖v‖∞ of universal and random per-
turbations.
Table 2: Results of the same universal adversarial perturbation
on two victim models: Wavenet and Mozilla DeepSpeech. The
universal perturbation was trained on the DeepSpeech model.
Wavenet Mozilla DeepSpeech
‖v‖∞ MeandBx(v)
Success
Rate (%)
Mean
CER
Success
Rate (%)
Mean
CER
150 -38.34 26.97 0.37 72.49 0.82
200 -35.84 31.18 0.40 80.47 0.95
300 -32.32 42.05 0.47 89.06 1.11
400 -29.82 63.28 0.60 88.24 1.07
architecture based on WaveNet [9]. For this study, we use a
publicly available pre-trained model of WaveNet [35] and eval-
uate the transcriptions obtained using clean and adversarial au-
dio for the same unseen validation dataset as used in our previ-
ous experiments. Our results in Table 2 indicate that our attack
is transferable to a significant extent for this particular setting.
Specifically, when the mean dBx(v) = −29.82, we are able
to achieve a 63.28% success rate while attacking the WaveNet
based ASR model. This result demonstrates the practicality of
such adversarial perturbations, since they are able to generalize
well across data points and architectures.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we demonstrate the existence of audio-agnostic
adversarial perturbations for speech recognition systems. We
demonstrate that our audio-agnostic adversarial perturbation
generalizes well across unseen data points and to some extent
across unseen networks. Our proposed end-to-end approach can
be used to further understand the vulnerabilities and blind spots
of deep neural network based ASR system, and provide insights
for building more robust neural networks.
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